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As a policy consideration, courts may be reluctant to extend the
protection of the Tort Claims Act to a malefactor such as the plaintiff,
though not a prisoner in the narrow sense. If given the right to sue
while incarcerated, the prisoner may disrupt prison routine and discipline by seizing upon every opportunity to leave the prison confines
for trips to the courthouse. 12 Moreover, servicemen 13 and many
federal prison inmates 14 are protected by some form of injury compensation benefits. Hence, cases denying tort relief to servicemen
and prisoners have rested, at least in part, upon the premise that Congress did not intend to afford them more than one remedy. 15
Therefore, where servicemen and prisoners are concerned, the decision in the instant case achieved a commendable result. However,
the case highlights a possible inequity in the provision of the Tort
Claims Act which excludes suits arising out of assault and battery.
The plaintiff's complaint was based on an alleged negligent omission
of Government employees, and not on an assault and battery of an
inmate. Nevertheless, the Court, in construing the provision, stated
that it does not refer to claims of assault and battery, since Congress
could have, but did not, so word it. Consequently, in cases where an
assault or battery results in injury to a person other than a serviceman
or prisoner, due to the negligence of Government employees, there
could be no relief under the Act. An enlightened republic ought not
to suffer its citizens to receive such injuries without recourse. "The
exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced." 16

X
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR SOLICITATION OF FORMER EMPLOYER'S
CusTOM Es.-Plaintiff advertising agency sought damages from its

former account executives alleged to have been sustained as the result
of a conspiracy by the latter to deprive plaintiff of its principal cushis suit against the Federal Government for injuries incurred during his
confinement are barred. See Van Zuch v. United States, supra note 8.
12 See Duffy v. State, supra note 11.
13 See Feres v. United States, supra note 10 at 144 (statutes collected
therein).
1448 STAT. 1211-1212 (1934),
18 U.S.C. § 4126 (Supp. 1952).
15 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950) (serviceman);
Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Va. 1953) (prisoner).
16 Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153
N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926) [quoted with approval in reference to the Tort Claims
Act in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383
(1949)].
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tomers and key employees.' The Court held that their active solicitation of plaintiff's customers and key employees, while still in plaintiff's
employ, amounted to such acts of bad faith and unfair dealing as to
constitute a breach of their fiduciary duties. 2 Duane Jones Co. v.
Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954).
A fiduciary relationship between parties is implicit in business
employment, 3 even where, as in the present case, there is no expressed
contract of employment.4 The employee's acts must not conflict with
the business interests of his employer.5 Even after termination of
employment, he is not permitted to use knowledge of a confidential
nature acquired during, and incidental to, his employment if it will
injure his former employer. 6 A breach of this duty will result in the
7
employee being held accountable in
8 damages, or he may be enjoined
acts.
such
of
from the continuance
In the instant case, the acts of the defendants in conspiring to
defeat their employer's interests were clearly a breach of the duty
owed to the plaintiff. The decision, however, indicates the difficulty
in determining, where there is no contract to the contrary, when, and
in what manner, an employee may act with respect to establishing himself in competition with his former employer, without subjecting himself to liability for the breach of his fiduciary duty. Specifically, the
problem may be considered in the light of the following situations:
(1) The solicitation of customers before termination of the employment. Because of the fiduciary nature of the employment relationship, solicitation under this circumstance constitutes an act of "bad
I Plaintiff also joined as defendants, the Manhattan Soap Co., a former
customer, Frank Burke, an officer of that company, alleged to have participated

in the conspiracy against the plaintiff, and Scheideler, Beck & Werner, Inc.,
an advertising agency established by the former account executives of plaintiff
to compete with it. The complaint was subsequently amended, so as to provide
a separate action for an accounting against the latter defendant, which is still
pending.
2 The Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as against the defendants, Manhattan Soap Co. and Burke, for failure to state a cause of action.
3See Robert Reis & Co. v. Volck, 151 App. Div. 613, 616, 136 N.Y. Supp.
367, 370 (1st Dep't 1912); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50

N.Y.S.2d 643, 655 (Sup. Ct 1944); see McClain, Injunctive Relief Against
Employees
Using Confidentila Infornztion, 23 Ky. L.J. 248, 253 (1934).
4
See, e.g., Little v. Gallus, 4 App. Div. 569, 574, 38 N.Y. Supp. 487, 489
(4th Dep't 1896).

5See Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 N.Y. 133, 138,

5 N.E.2d 66, 67 (1936) ; Murray v. Beard, 102 N.Y. 505, 508, 7 N.E. 553, 554

(1886).
6

See Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 206, 197 N.E. 217, 218 (1935) ; Towne

& Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newberry, 119 N.Y.S.2d 324, 325
(Sup. Ct. 1952) ; see Note, 165 A.L.R. 1453, 1454 (1946).

7 Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N.Y. Supp. 44 (Sup.
Ct. 1921) ; see Note, 165 A.L.R. 1453, 1461 (1946).

8 People's Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671,
157 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1916), affd mer., 224 N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886

(1918); see Note, 165 A.L.R. 1453, 1457 (1946).
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faith" on the part of the employee, thus rendering him accountable to
his employer. 9 The underlying reason upon which liability is based
is that a person should not use his position of trust and confidence
to the detriment of his employer. 10 On the other hand, if notice of
intention to terminate the employment is given, there are dicta to the
effect that subsequent solicitation, not involving the use of confidential
information, is permissible." It is here that the present case creates
uncertainty. Since conspiracy, which was the basis of the action, had
occurred prior to giving notice, it was not necessary to determine
whether specific acts of solicitation after notice had been given, but
before the actual termination of employment, were violations of a
fiduciary duty. However, had there been no conspiracy, the Court
failed to consider the possibility of whether or not liability would attach for the mere solicitation itself, since the list of customers used
was not of a confidential nature. Nevertheless, in a recent comment on
this case, 12 it was felt that in this important area of employee activity,
potential liability for acts of solicitation could be inferred from the
opinion, even though the employee had given notice of termination
prior to his soliciting customers. Nonetheless, the Court has left to
speculation and future litigation the question of liability under these
circumstances, when a clarification of the law to be applied would
have been greatly appreciated.
(2) The solicitation of customers after termination of the employment. When, in the absence of a negative covenant, the former
employee solicits customers of his former employer, knowledge of
whom was gained during the period of employment, liability is predicated on whether or not such information was of a confidential
nature.' 3 If no unfair tactics are involved, and if the information
might have been readily acquired by any industrious competitor, such
9 Robert Reis & Co. v. Volck, 151 App. Div. 613, 136 N.Y. Supp. 367 (1st
Dep't 1912) ; Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., supra note 7; see
35 Am. JuR.516.
20 See Robert Reis & Co. v. Volck, sapra note 9 at 616, 136 N.Y. Supp. at

370.

-1 See Garst v. Scott, 114 Kan. 676, 220 Pac. 277, 279 (1923) ; see Nichol v.
Martyn, 2 Esp. 732, 170 Eng. Rep. 513 (K.B. 1799) (employee permitted to

solicit his employer's customers on a prospective basis for the establishment of
his own competitive business). It is to be noted that there appears to be an
absence of litigation or opinion on the effect of giving notice in the State
of New York.

12See

9 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
126 (1954).
Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824, 133 N.Y. Supp. 910 (4th Dep't
1912), aff'd ne., 210 N.Y. 529, 103 N.E. 1121 (1913) (court decided that the
customers were known to the general trade and not restricted to the knowledge

YORK
13

of the former employer) ; People's Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co. v. Light,
171 App. Div. 671, 157 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1916), affd mere., 224 N.Y.
727, 121 N.E. 886 (1918) (court decided that the list of customers requiring
laundry service, unadvertised and reiched only by personal contact, was of a

confidential nature).
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knowledge is not deemed confidential.' 4 Yet, if such information were
dependent on the employer's compiled list of customers, restricted as
to general access, adverse use of a written copy of such information
would constitute a breach of confidence.' 6 The use of the copy, in
these instances, is a violation of the property right attached to the
duplication of any written material possessed by the employer.16 But
if, under the same circumstances, the list is memorized, no liability
for use attaches,' 7 since equity is not able "to wipe such a slate
clean." 18

It is regrettable that the Court did not more clearly indicate what
effect, if any, the giving of notice prior, to the termination of employment would have on the employee's potential liability. In this respect, notice of intention to terminate the employment should release
the employee from any fiduciary duty to the extent that he may
solicit customers for his future business if he does not use any confidential information. In addition, where solicitation is subsequent to
termination of the employment, it is to be noted that the former employee is undoubtedly more familiar with the restrictions imposed
upon him by the required standards of fair competition than he is
with those imposed on him because of a fiduciary duty carried over
from his previous employment.
Consequently, in determining whether or not there has been a
breach of a duty because of the utilization of alleged confidential customer lists, the courts should be primarily concerned with the danger
of granting or recognizing a monopolistic control in the particular
business field to the former employer by declaring such customer lists
to be confidential per se. To avoid such a result, the courts should
consider the degree of competition in the particular business if the
employer's customers list used by a former employee is alleged to be
of a confidential nature. The liability, then, for the use of such lists
would vary in direct proportion with the degree of competition in that
business. In this way, the former employee will be more capable of
determining the extent to, and direction in, which his business activities may be pursued without incurring liability.
14 See Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner, 99 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
15 Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N.Y. Supp. 874 (Sup.
Ct. 1908), aff'd mnem., 131 App. Div. 922, 115 N.Y. Supp. 1150 (4th Dep't 1909) ;
Witkopt & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 64 Misc. 374, 118 N.Y. Supp. 461 (Sup. Ct.
1909) ; see Boosing v. Dorman, supra note 13 at 826, 133 N.Y. Supp. at 911;
S. W. Scott & Co. v.Scott, 186 App. Div. 518, 524-525, 174 N.Y. Supp. 583, 587
(1st Dep't 1919).
16 See Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, supra note 15 at 378, 118 N.Y. Supp.
at 464.
17 See American Binder Co. v. Regal & Wade Mfg. Co., 106 N.Y.S.2d 543,
547 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; see Note, 126 A.L.R. 758, 768 (1940).
IsSee Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717,
132 N.Y. Supp. 37, 39 (1st Dep't 1911).

